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Abstract
This paper compares two approaches towards the empirical inertia
of inﬂation and output. Two variants that produce persistence are
added to a baseline DSGE model of sticky prices: 1) sticky information
applied to ﬁrms, workers, and households; and 2) a backward-looking
inﬂation indexation along with habit formation. The rival models are
then estimated using U.S. data in order to determine their plausibility.
It is shown that the sticky information model is better at predicting
inﬂation, wage inﬂation, and the degree of price stickiness. Output
dynamics, however, are better explained by habit persistence.
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1 Introduction
Inﬂation inertia and output persistence have become major concerns in mon-
etary economics. Inﬂation displays not only a sizable inertia, but also a
hump-shaped adjustment pattern that lasts for several quarters after a vari-
ation in the target interest rate. For the U.S., inﬂation reaches its peak eﬀect
almost 3 years after a shock in monetary policy, while for output this time
is about 2 years (see Christiano et al., 1999, 2005). Mojon and Peersman
(2003) and Sousa and Zaghini (2004) report that, for Europe, patterns for
inﬂation and output are similar.
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have incorporated
two main strategies to explain the observed delayed responses to monetary
policy. First, the work of Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) inspired the inclusion of
a backward-looking inﬂation indexation rule for non-resetter ﬁrms that has
proving to be a powerful tool in replicating the inertia of inﬂation (see Chris-
tiano et al., 2005). Second, environments without full information, such as
the sticky information framework popularized by Mankiw and Reis (2002),
can also replicate, at least qualitatively, the hump-shaped reaction of inﬂa-
tion.
The aim of this paper is to compare the predictive power of these two al-
ternatives using recent data for the U.S. economy. Attention is focus on the
dynamic responses of a set of macroeconomic variables to a shock in mone-
tary policy, the latter estimated with an SVAR with U.S. data for the period
1960(1)-2007(2). The approach employed herein follows the Minimum Dis-
tance Estimation (MDE) proposed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and
used extensively in papers by Altig et al. (2005), Christiano et al. (2005),
Boivin and Giannoni (2006), and others.1 In the present analysis, the pur-
1MDE is chosen over Bayesian methods in the present analysis because the attention is
focus on the medium-run eﬀects of monetary policy on inﬂation and output. This enables
to compare the results of this paper with the previous literature concerning shocks in
monetary policy, similar to Christiano et al. (2005) for instance. A Bayesian estimation
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pose is to match some selected model-based IRFs with their empirical SVAR
counterparts, computed in a previous stage, in order to estimate the parame-
ters that create persistence and hump-shaped patterns in the model economy.
Herein, the selected variables are output, inﬂation, wage inﬂation, and the
target interest rate. This technique has proven to be useful in providing
important information about aggregate ﬂuctuations, since the estimation is
subject to the model economy cross-equation restrictions and can be set to
diﬀerent response horizons. The latter might provide further information for
plausible parameter identiﬁcation.2
The baseline model assumes that prices and wages are rigid. Then, in the
ﬁrst variant, sticky information is added to ﬁrms, workers and, households,
as proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2007). The second variant is a backward-
looking model, where lagging inﬂation indexation is assumed for ﬁrms and
workers, while habit formation is present for households. The backward-
looking model is very similar to that of Christiano et al. (2005).
The main result is that the sticky information model outperforms the backward-
looking model with respect to inﬂation and wage inﬂation. Yet, the estima-
tions are very sensitive to the degree of interest rate persistence. As for
output, habit persistence proves to be a more powerful tool than applying
would require a more complex model involving diﬀerent assumptions about the structure
of shocks in technology, government spending, cost-push inﬂation, interest rate spreads,
among others. See Smets and Wouters (2007) for an example of a backward-looking DSGE
model estimated with Bayesian methods.
2Canova and Sala (2007) have raised some identiﬁcation issues that can be present
within the MDE technique applied to IRFs. Their main criticisms are as follows: (1) The
objective function may contain large ﬂat surfaces that would avoid a unique parameter
identiﬁcation; (2) Fixing critical parameters may seriously constrain the distribution prop-
erties of the estimated parameters; (3) Small sample bias can aﬀect both the identiﬁcation
of shocks in the SVAR and the point estimate of parameters; and (4) Near-observational
equivalent models may lead the researcher not to reject an incorrect model speciﬁcation.
All of these points are addressed in the present paper within a robustness analysis. The
solutions to these problems are (1) Changing the initial points suﬃciently in the estima-
tion algorithm; (2) Performing an extensive sensitivity analysis; (3) Changing the sample
period and the response horizons of the estimation; and (4) Simultaneously analyzing two
near-observational equivalent models.
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information stickiness in households. Also, the sticky information model es-
timates a speed of adjustment in prices that is much closer to micro-data
studies3 than the backward-looking model.
Sticky information can be considered as a potential replacement for lag-
ging inﬂation indexation in macro models. Though much work needs to
be done, this paper provides further evidence to support the sticky infor-
mation approach extensively studied in the related literature.4 This paper
is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the sticky information and the
backward-looking models used for estimation. Section 3 details the econo-
metric approach. Section 4 discusses the estimation results and performs a
robustness analysis. Section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks. Finally, the
Appendix discusses the model details and resolution methods.
2 Two variants of the sticky price model
2.1 Common set-up
The common economic environment for both models is as follows. A large
number of competitive ﬁrms produce a homogeneous good using a continuum
of diﬀerentiated, intermediate goods. The homogeneous good can either be
consumed or used in the intermediate sector, where ﬁrms employ labor and
raw materials as input. Final sector prices are competitive, whereas the in-
termediate sector is characterized by monopolistic competition. In order to
enhance strategic complementarity among price setters, there is an endoge-
nous mark-up that varies with the relative price of the ﬁrm and a marginal
cost speciﬁcation that depends on real wages and on the costs of intermedi-
ate input. We assume no capital formation; thus, we focus on a model with
3See Bils and Klenow (2004), and Klenow and Willis (2007).
4See, for example, Mankiw and Reis (2002), Dupor et al. (2008), Kiley (2007), Coibion
(2007), or Trabandt (2007) for papers that compare sticky information with sticky prices;
and Carroll (2003), Andre´, Lo´pez Salido and Nelson (2005), Khan and Zhu (2006), Korenok
(2008) or Mankiw and Reis (2007) for papers that measure the degree of information
stickiness in the economy.
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short- to medium- run dynamics. Households are composed of two entities: a
consumer and a worker. The former chooses consumption, money, and bond
holdings, while the latter sets his wage by using his monopolistic power, since
every household is diﬀerent, depending on its labor type. There is no active
role for the ﬁscal authority, while the central bank follows a Taylor rule with
policy inertia to set the nominal interest rate. We assume there is only one
source of disturbances which correspond to shocks in monetary policy.
Nominal rigidities take the usual Calvo format: in each and every period, an
intermediate ﬁrm can re-optimize its price with probability 1 − αp,x, while
workers can adjust wages with probability 1 − αw,x, with x ∈ {si, b}. The
subindex si and b denote the parameters related to the sticky information
and the backward-looking models, respectively. If a ﬁrm (worker) is unable
to re-optimize at period t, then, in the sticky information model, its price
(wage) is updated in proportion to the steady state inﬂation; in contrast,
in the backward-looking model, a speciﬁc indexation rule, that is described
later, is used.
It is worth notice that the following models share the same timing restrictions
than the SVAR described in Section 3. This is achieved by assuming that
output, inﬂation, and wage inﬂation are decided prior to the observation of
the monetary policy shock, as assumed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997,
1999) and may others.
2.2 Sticky information model
Information ﬂows slowly in this economy. We assume that at each and every
period an agent has a probability 1−γx,si of collecting the newest information
available; here, x ∈ {p, w, c} denotes ﬁrms, workers, or consumers, respec-
tively. As Mankiw and Reis (2007) assume, we allow consumers to have a
diﬀerent frequency of processing new information than workers, since this
5
might give more ﬂexibility to output inertia.5 The economic environment
implies that ﬁrms and workers face two rigidity sources. First, they cannot
reset prices or wages freely every period, and second, they might not have
the newest information about macroeconomic innovations. Since price re-
optimizations and information updates are assumed to be processes that are
independent of each other, the average elapsed time for price adjustments is
1
1−αp,si
+ 1
1−γp,si
−1 periods after a macro innovation takes place (see Bruchez,
2007, for further details). The same reasoning holds for wages. In contrast,
average consumers will react only 1
1−γc,si
periods after a macro shock. Within
this setting, the following relationships must be kept in equilibrium:
yˆl,t = Et−l
[
yˆl,t+1 − σ
−1(ˆıt − Πˆt+1)
]
(1)
pˆl,t = Et−l
[
(1− βαp,si)κ˜p(ωpYˆt + Wˆt) + βαp,si(pˆl,t+1 + Πˆt+1)
]
(2)
wˆl,t = Et−l
[
(1− βαw,si)κ˜w
(
ω˜wYˆt − Wˆt
)
+ βαw,si(wˆl,t+1 + Πˆ
w
t+1)
]
(3)
ıˆt = ρi ıˆt−1 + (1− ρi)
(
aπΠˆt + ayYˆt
)
+ et (4)
et = ρeet−1 + σννt (5)
for l = 1, 2, 3, ...
where
Πˆwt = Wˆt − Wˆt−1 + Πˆt (6)
Yˆt = (1− γc,si)
∞∑
l=0
γlc,siyˆl,t (7)
αp,si
1− αp,si
Πˆt = (1− γp,si)
∞∑
l=0
γlp,sipˆl,t (8)
αw,si
1− αw,si
Πˆwt = (1− γw,si)
∞∑
l=0
γlw,siwˆl,t (9)
and
κ˜p ≡
1
(1− μsq)−1(1 + θpεμ) + θpωp
; κ˜ω ≡
1
1 + ωωθω
; ω˜ω ≡ ωωφ + σ
−1
5It can also be argued that the probability of a worker’s updating information is inﬂu-
enced by the union to which he belongs.
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Et−l is the expectations operator conditional to the information available in
period t− l. Consumption, relative prices, and wages for agents with l-lags
on their information set are represented by yˆl,t, pˆl,t, and wˆl,t, respectively. Wˆt
is the aggregate real wage, Πˆt is inﬂation, Πˆ
w
t is wage inﬂation, Yˆt is aggre-
gate consumption, ıˆt is the nominal interest rate, and et represents persistent
monetary policy shocks. All variables are expressed as deviations from the
steady-state values. β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, σ > 0 is
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, sq ∈ (0, 1) represents the share
of material goods used by the intermediate sector, θp > 0 is the steady-state
price elasticity of demand, μ > 1 is the steady-state value of the endoge-
nous mark-up, εμ is the steady-state elasticity of the endogenous mark-up,
ωp is the real marginal cost elasticity with respect to the level of production,
θω > 0 is the wage elasticity of labor demand, ωω > 0 is the elasticity of the
marginal disutility of labor, and φ > 1 is the inverse elasticity of output with
respect to labor (see the Appendix section, available in the working paper
version, for the detailed presentation of the model).
Equations (1)–(3) are the building blocks of the IS-curve and the Phillips-
curves for prices and wages. The monetary policy rule, equation (4), delivers
interest rate persistence from two sources. First, the central bank’s aim in
smoothing the interest rate is denoted by ρi; and second, persistent deviations
from the baseline rule, which consists of the discretionary part of monetary
policy, are denoted by ρe.
6
Solving system (1)–(5) requires taking into account the sequence of delayed
expectations of endogenous variables, which in this case is inﬁnite. Mankiw
and Reis (2007) deal with this problem by employing an undetermined coef-
ﬁcients’ solution method. The details of the solution algorithm are depicted
in the Appendix.
6These two sources are both important and have very diﬀerent implications for the
overall macroeconomic sluggishness implied by the model economy (for further details, see
Rudebusch, 2006; or Carrillo, Fe`ve and Matheron, 2007).
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2.3 Backward-looking model
Christiano et al. (2005), among others, consider a version of the new Key-
nesian sticky price model that incorporates inﬂation indexation on price and
wage setting, and habit formation on consumption. These special features
have made it possible to replicate the empirical hump-shaped reactions of
inﬂation and output after a shock in monetary policy. In this model, ﬁrms
and workers do not face any information lags; thus, prices and wages need
on average 1
1−αx,b
periods to adjust after a macroeconomic innovation (here
x ∈ {p, w}). Notice that this average duration is structurally diﬀerent from
that on the sticky information model. Furthermore, it is assumed that if a
ﬁrm (or worker) cannot re-optimize its price (wage) at time t, then its price
(wage) is updated according to
xt = (1 + π)
1−γx,b(1 + Πt−1)
γx,bxt−1, (10)
where π is the steady-state inﬂation and 0 ≤ γx,b ≤ 1 is the degree of in-
dexation to the most recently available inﬂation measure. When γx,b = 1,
the latter constitutes a special rule with a purely lagging inﬂation indexation.
Habit formation is introduced by assuming that the weighted diﬀerence be-
tween actual and past consumption is the relevant consumption argument in
the utility function -i.e., yt − γc,byt−1, where 0 ≤ γc,b < 1 is the habit persis-
tence parameter. Overall, the aggregate dynamics of the backward-looking
model evolve as follows:
(1− βγc,b)σEt−1λˆt = Et−1
[
βγc,bYˆt+1 − (1 + βγ
2
c,b)Yˆt + γc,bYˆt−1
]
(11)
λˆt = Et
[
λˆt+1 + ıˆt − Πˆt+1
]
(12)
Πˆt − γp,bΠˆt−1 = Et−1
[
κp(ωpYˆt + Wˆt) + β(Πˆt+1 − γp,bπˆt)
]
(13)
Πˆwt − γw,bΠˆt−1 = Et−1
[
κw(ωwφYˆt − λˆt − Wˆt) + β(Πˆ
w
t+1 − γw,bΠˆt)
]
(14)
Πˆwt = Wˆt − Wˆt−1 + Πˆt (15)
where
κp ≡
(1− βαp,b)(1− αp,b)
αp,b
κ˜p; κω ≡
(1− βαw,b)(1− αw,b)
αw,b
κ˜ω;
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and λˆt is the marginal utility of income. The monetary policy speciﬁcation
remains unchanged.
3 Econometric approach
This section details the monetary SVAR and its implied IRFs that will be
used to estimate the two DSGE models described above. It also presents the
minimum distance estimation (MDE) approach.
3.1 The Monetary SVAR and U.S. data
The analysis starts by characterizing the actual economy’s response to a
monetary policy shock. As is now standard, this is done by estimating a
monetary SVAR along the lines proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (1996, 1999) in order to identify shocks in monetary policy.7 We
consider a structural SVAR of the form:
A0Zt = A1Zt−1 + · · ·+ AZt− + ηt,
In order to identify the structural shocks to monetary policy νt, a short-run
identiﬁcation strategy using a Cholesky decomposition is employed. Thus,
the data vector Zt can be decomposed according to Zt =
(
Z ′1,t, ıˆt, Z
′
2,t
)′
. Z1,t
is a n1 × 1 vector composed of variables that do not respond contemporane-
ously to the monetary shock νt, and thus are assumed to be predetermined.
In contrast, Z2,t is a n2 × 1 vector containing variables that are allowed to
respond contemporaneously to νt. The optimal lag length  is determined
by minimizing the Hannan-Quinn information criterium. In the empirical
analysis,  is found that be equal to 4.
The data used for the SVAR come from the U.S. Non-Farm Business sector
over the sample period 1960(1)-2007(2). In addition to the federal funds rate,
7See Christiano et al. (2005); and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999) for other
examples of identifying strategies.
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ıˆt, the variables used for estimation are the linearly detrended logarithm of
per capita GDP, Yˆt, the growth rate of GDP’s implicit price deﬂator, Πˆt,
and the growth rate of nominal hourly compensation, Πˆwt .
8 In addition, two
“information” variables are included. First, the growth rate of the logarithm
of the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) price index of sensitive com-
modities, Πˆct , is considered to mitigate the so-called price puzzle.
9 Second,
the growth rate of M2, ξˆt, is included to exploit some potential information
involved in money growth.10 In order to implement the monetary policy
shock’s identiﬁcation strategy outlined above, we set Z1,t = (Yˆt, Πˆt, Πˆ
w
t , Πˆ
c
t)
′
and Z2,t = ξˆt.
3.2 Minimum distance estimation strategy
Let ψM represent the vector containing all parameters listed in the sticky
information model (M = si) and the backward-looking model (M = b), re-
spectively. Further, let ψ2,M be the vector of parameters to be estimated,
while ψ1,M denotes the vector containing all of the remaining parameters,
so ψM = (ψ
′
1,M , ψ
′
2M
)′. The calibrating parameters ψ1,M will remain ﬁxed
through out the estimations and across the models, i.e. ψ1,si = ψ1,b = ψ1.
Thus, variations in the empirical performances of the rival models will result
only from changes in ψ2,M , which refers explicitly to the parameters respon-
sible for creating persistence in each model.
The parameters ψ2,M are estimated by minimizing a measure of the distance
between the empirical responses of key aggregate variables and their model
8The civilian, non-institutional population over 16 was used as a measure of population.
Quadratically detrended or ﬁrst-diﬀerenced output were also taken into account as diﬀerent
measures of potential output, without quantitatively altering the main conclusions of the
SVAR.
9This is a fairly standard practice in the literature. See Sims (1992), Eichenbaum
(1992), Christiano et al. (1996, 1999).
10The data were extracted from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the FREDII database,
and the CRB.
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counterparts.11 More precisely, attention is focus on the responses of vector
Xt, which is a subset of Zt, and includes output, inﬂation, wage inﬂation,
and the fed funds rate -i.e., Xt = (Yˆt, Πˆt, Πˆ
w
t , ıˆt).
We deﬁne θk as the vector of responses to a monetary shock at horizon
k ≥ 0, as implied by the above SVAR. Then, the object to match is θ =
vec([θ0, θ1, . . . , θK ])
′, where K is the selected horizon.12 We then let h (·)
denote the mapping from the structural parameters ψM to the DSGE coun-
terpart of θ. The estimate of ψ2,M is obtained by minimizing
JT = (h(ψM )− θˆT )VT (h(ψM)− θˆT )
′,
where θˆT is an estimate of θ, T is the sample size, and VT is a diagonal
matrix with the sample variances of the θ along the diagonal. These vari-
ances are the ones that were used to construct the conﬁdence intervals for
the SVAR-based IRFs. In line with Altig et al. (2005), the standard er-
rors for ψ2,M are computed using the delta-function method. The choice
of the weighting matrix has some speciﬁc advantages. As Christiano et al.
(2005) point out, it ensures that the model–based IRFs lie as much as pos-
sible inside the SVAR-based IRFs conﬁdence intervals; it also allows one to
decompose JT into components pertaining to each element of Xt, according
to JT =
∑dim(X)
i=1 JT,i. The latter helps us determine on which dimension the
model succeeds in or fails to replicate the impulse response functions implied
by the SVAR.
3.3 Calibration and estimating parameters
Persistence and hump-shaped patterns are the key elements that the rival
models need to match. Thus, the estimations focus only on parameters that
11See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Amato and Laubach (2003), Altig et al. (2005),
Giannoni and Woodford (2004), Christiano et al. (2005), and Boivin and Giannoni (2006).
12It is important to emphasize the DSGE models previously described should include
the same time exclusion restrictions as the monetary SVAR, i.e., we should not allow some
variables to respond to the monetary policy shock during the impact period.
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enable the two DSGE models to mimic this behavior. More speciﬁcally, we
want to make sure that the models’ IRFs depend only on the particular spec-
iﬁcation of how inertia in inﬂation, wage inﬂation, and output are built into
each model.
3.3.1 Set of estimations
In order to allow a robust investigation, three diﬀerent sets of estimations
are performed. The ﬁrst, denoted by (1), estimates only the γ parameters,
that is, the degree of information stickiness in one model, and the degree of
backward-looking indexation and habit formation in the other. However, this
set does not take into account the diﬀerent interpretations each model gives
to price rigidities. In fact, in the sticky information model, price changes
do not translate directly into price adjustments that account for the latest
macroeconomic innovations; prices may adjust only to old information. In
contrast, the backward-looking model does assume that any price change is,
indeed, a price adjustment to the newest macroeconomic innovations.
As a consequence, the average time it takes for prices to reﬂect changes in
monetary policy is structurally diﬀerent: it is 1
1−γp,si
+ 1
1−αp,si
−1 for the sticky
information model, while it is 1
1−αp,b
for the backward-looking model. This
suggests that the likelihood of changing prices, 1−αp, could be very diﬀerent
from one model to the other. This possibility is taken into account in the set
of estimations (2), which also includes the αs as estimating parameters.
The set of estimations (3) is a response to the criticism that Canova and Sala
(2007) have about the Minimum Distance Estimation technique, namely, that
ﬁxing critical parameters may considerably constraint the distribution prop-
erties of the estimated parameters. After a round of sensitivity analyses,
one ﬁnds that these parameters correspond to the persistence in the interest
rate. This is not surprising since Rudebusch (2006) and Carrillo et al. (2007)
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show that the source and the degree of interest rate inertia may imply very
diﬀerent aggregate dynamics for inﬂation and output within a DSGE model.
Therefore, at least one of the parameters for the interest rate inertia should
be considered for estimation. Carrillo at al. (2007) also show that the in-
terest rate inertia in the U.S. is mainly driven by the discretionary part of
monetary policy, in other words, by the parameter ρe in our setting. There-
fore, the parameters estimated in the set (3) are the γs, the αs, and the ρe.
13
3.3.2 Calibration
Calibrating the remaining common parameters can be arbitrary. It is there-
fore important to make consensual and conservative choices. We must also
be sure that the chosen calibration does not imply implausible responses by
the models’ counterparts of Xt.
14 The calibration is reported in Table 1.
Preferences. The subjective discount rate, β, equals 0.99, implying a
steady-state annualized real interest rate of 4%. We then set σ = ωw = 1,
implying a logarithmic utility for consumption and a unitary elasticity of
marginal labor disutility, respectively, as considered by Altig et al. (2005)
and Christiano et al. (2005).
Technology. φ, the inverse of the labor input elasticity to output, equals
1.333, denoting decreasing returns to scale in labor. Thus, the steady-state
share of labor income is about 62.5%, after correcting for the markup. If the
intermediate ﬁrm production function is Cobb-Douglas, then ωp equals φ−1.
The share of material goods in gross output, sq, is set to 50%, as suggested
by Rotemberg and Woodford (1995). Following Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) and Christiano et al. (2005), we set the markup on prices to 20%,
13Estimations with both interest rate persistence parameters are made in the sensitivity
analysis, without changing any of the conclusions of the present paper.
14The sensitivity of the results to the calibration is assessed in section 5.
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i.e. μp = 1.20. This implies an elasticity of demand for goods θp = 6. The
markup elasticity to relative demand, μ, is set to 1, as used by Woodford
(2003). Finally, θw is set to 21 as used by Christiano et al. (2005), implying
a wage markup of 5%.
Price/Wage Setting. Only to account for the estimation set (1), we set
αp = αw = 0.66, valid for both models. This value is used by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) and many others, and implies an average time laps for
price changes of almost 9 months.
Nominal Interest Rate Target Level. Following Taylor (1993), we set
aπ = 1.5 and ay = 0.5/4, since we focus on a quarterly measure of the
output gap. These values are approximately the same as those considered by
Christiano et al. (2005) in their sensitivity analysis. In accordance with the
results of Carrillo, Fe`ve and Matheron (2007), ρi is set to 0.20, whereas ρe
equals 0.90, at least for the ﬁrst two sets of estimations. σν = 0.1736 is set
to match the impact response of the fed funds rate to a shock in monetary
policy, given by the SVAR.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Responses of U.S. data to a monetary policy shock
The empirical responses of output, inﬂation, wage inﬂation, and interest rate
to a contractionary monetary policy shock are reported in Figure 1, with
k = 30. The plain line is the SVAR’s point estimate of the empirical re-
sponses, while the shaded areas indicate the 90% conﬁdence interval for the
point estimates.
These ﬁndings replicate previous results reported by Christiano et al. (1999,
2005), as well as other authors. Output exhibits a signiﬁcant persistence and
a hump-shaped pattern, as it responds very little initially and then sharply
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drops. It reaches its peak two years after the occurrence of the shock in
monetary policy. The responses of inﬂation suggest a small, but insigniﬁ-
cant, price-puzzle in the very short run. Nonetheless, inﬂation reacts with
a persistent hump-shaped proﬁle, reaching its peak around three years after
the shock. The responses of wage inﬂation are qualitatively similar, slightly
lagging behind inﬂation. As discussed by Woodford (2003), the delayed re-
sponse of inﬂation is a typical behavior that any monetary DSGE model
should accurately mimic. Finally, the fed funds rate increases immediately,
and then gradually declines to the point where it eventually crosses the x axis.
4.2 Results of estimations
Table 2 shows the results of the three sets of estimations proposed in the
previous section. One thing we have to keep in mind when analyzing the
estimation results is that the models should not describe unrealistic envi-
ronments, especially with regard to the rate of updating information or the
speed of price and wage changes.
Estimation set(1). In this set of estimations, only the degree of infor-
mation stickiness and the level of backward-looking indexation and habit
persistence are estimated. Notably, the frequency of price and wage re-
optimizations are kept constant in both models. The values assumed for the
α parameters in calibration is set to 0.66, like many macro models.
In such environment, the sticky information model performs very poorly, as
denoted by the large size of the corresponding J -statistic. According to col-
umn (1) of Table 2, the sticky information model anticipates that the proba-
bility of updating information is 0.29 (=1-0.71) for ﬁrms and 0.35 for workers
in any period. Thus, any ﬁrm or worker would obtain new information on
the average every 9 or 10 months (= 1
1−γx,h
for x ∈ {p, w} in quarters). This
implies that prices and wages would reﬂect adjustments, on the average, one
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year and 4 months after a variation in the interest rate (= 1
1−γj,h
+ 1
1−αj,h
− 1
in quarters). In the same vein, less than 7 per cent of households obtain new
information every quarter, meaning that the average consumer would adjust
his spending more than three years after an interest rate change (= 1
1−γc,si
in quarters). Nevertheless, in all cases, the size of the model responses is
too small in comparison with the predictions from the SVAR. In summary,
in this setting, the sticky information model fails to reproduce the adequate
impulse responses of output and the measures of inﬂation, as the ﬁrst row of
Figure 1 shows.
In contrast, the results of the backward-looking model are closer to the data
and anticipate that ﬁrms and workers use full lagging inﬂation indexation.
The parameter for habit persistence, equal to 0.86, lies in the range of avail-
able estimates based on aggregate data (see Boivin and Giannoni, 2006; and
Christiano et al., 2005). Evidently, the estimation for this model was car-
ried out with the constraint that lagging inﬂation indexation belongs to the
range [0,1], and what we can deduce is that the full power of the backward-
looking model in replicating the data relies on this tool. No more economic
explanations can be drawn out from that. The frequency of price and wage
changes is ﬁxed after 9 months on the average (= 1
1−αx,b
for x ∈ {p, w} in
quarters). One must remember that, in the backward-looking model, price
changes translate directly into adjustments to new innovations in the econ-
omy. There are, however, inconsistencies when one compares these results
with those found in micro-data studies. These issues will be discussed in
detail later.
Finally, we see that neither sticky information nor habit persistence seems to
successfully predict well the behavior of output after a shock in the interest
rate.
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Estimation set (2). Now we let the probability of changing prices and
wages be estimated along with the γ parameters. In this setting, the results
of both models improve substantially, as the J -statistic shows in the bottom
of column (2) in Table 2. The backward-looking model still conserves a better
goodness-of-ﬁt than sticky information, a result that is mainly achieved by
output responses. With regard to inﬂation and interest rate, the two mod-
els do not diﬀer too much from each other. Both inertia and hump-shaped
patterns are present in the two models, although the sticky information ap-
proach yields less persistence in the measures of inﬂation.
As anticipated, the sticky information model predicts a rate of changing
prices and wages that is substantially less than with the backward-looking
model. Nevertheless, the degree of price stickiness and the speed of updating
information for ﬁrms seem totally unrealistic. According to the estimation of
column (2), the sticky information speciﬁcation anticipates that prices will
be fully ﬂexible; the probability of not changing prices of about 6 per cent.
In contrast, it predicts that ﬁrms seldom learn about new macro innovations,
with only 4 per cent updating their information every quarter. Together, the
speed of changing prices and the rate of updating information imply that a
ﬁrm would, on the average, adjust its price more than 6 years after a change
in the interest rate (= 1
1−0.97
+ 1
1−0.025
− 1 in quarters), an unrealistic impli-
cation. In contrast, the same analysis for wages presumes it would take 3
years for a worker to adjust to innovations in monetary policy.
The extreme conclusions about the nature of price adjustments in the sticky
information model give a clear signal of a substitution eﬀect among the two
sources of rigidities in prices. It seems plausible to assume, under such cir-
cumstances, that the sticky information model requires very slowly updating
of information whenever prices are very ﬂexible, and vice-versa. This issue
will be discussed further in the sensitivity analysis.
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With regard to output, the sticky information model still performs very
poorly. First, it predicts that the probability of a household updating in-
formation every period is less than 5 per cent, which translates into an
average duration of consumption adjustment of about 6 years. This ﬁnd-
ing contrasts greatly with that of Carroll (2003), who, using the Michigan
Survey of Consumers, suggests that households update information once a
year. Also, Mankiw and Reis (2007), using a maximum likelihood estimation,
ﬁnd that households update their information about every year and a half.
Unfortunately, these authors do not assess whether their rates of updating
information lead to a proper quantitative reaction to their model-based out-
put with respect to actual output. More work has to be done in this area.
On the other hand, the backward-looking model predicts a somewhat higher
degree of price and wage stickiness than what was assumed in estimation
set (1). Here, prices would adjust every 11 months on the average, while
wages would do so every 14 months. Again, the problem is that these price
rigidities are not veriﬁed by micro-data studies. When it comes to output,
the backward-looking model increases its predictive power when compared
to the previous set of estimations.
Estimation set (3). Next, the inﬂuence of interest rate inertia is measured
by including the parameter ρe in the estimations. Inclusion of this coeﬃcient
is necessary due to the fact that ﬁxing this critical parameter signiﬁcantly
limits the distribution of the estimated coeﬃcients of the sticky information
model.15 In such a case, we ﬁnd the following: both models perform better,
and they even obtain a similar overall J -statistic. However, a closer look
reveals that the composition of the latter diﬀers substantially from model to
model. For output, the backward-looking speciﬁcation is superior to sticky
15This is a criticism of the MDE estimation technique that has been acknowledged by
Canova and Luca (2007) and may explain, in part, the unrealistic point estimates yielded
by estimation set (2).
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information in explaining the dynamics of consumption and output. The
opposite is true for the rest of the variables. Indeed, the goodness-of-ﬁt of
sticky information is almost 50 per cent better for the inﬂation measures and
slightly more accurate for the interest rate.
It also worth noting that the point estimates of interest rate inertia are simi-
lar in both models to the previous calibrated value of 0.90. What is surprising
is the impact of small changes in this parameter on the models’ ability to
mimic the behavior of aggregate variables.
In this estimation set, the sticky information model allows less ﬂexibility for
prices and wages and a higher speed of information diﬀusion than estimation
set (2). The model anticipates that nearly 11 per cent of ﬁrms would up-
date information every period, whereas about 71 per cent might change their
prices. For wages, the sticky information model presumes that less than 10
per cent of workers update their information every quarter, while around 67
per cent of them might change their wages.
The backward-looking model yields very consistent estimations about αp with
respect to previous estimations. For wages, this model estimates an even
higher degree of stickiness. In general, however, we can consider the estima-
tions of the backward-looking model as robust, since there are no big changes
in price and wage stickiness, habit formation, or the degree of backward-
looking indexation across the three sets of estimations considered.
Comparison with micro-data studies. The backward-looking model
suggests that prices change once a year on the average, and that every price
adjustment reﬂects the newest macroeconomic innovations in the economy.
This contrasts shortly with evidence provided at microeconomic levels. Bils
and Klenow (2004) report that, in the U.S., using data from the Bureau of
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Labor Statistics and covering 70 per cent of consumer spending, the median
duration for price changes is 4.3 months. This conﬁrms the well-known fact
that sticky-price models assume much more rigidity than in the real world.
Additionally, Klenow and Willis (2007), using micro-data from the U.S. CPI,
suggest that price changes react to old information and not to the newest
macro innovations.
On the other hand, the sticky information model, as estimated by set (3),
tells us that an average ﬁrm would re-set its price every 4 months, whereas its
information would be updated roughly every two years. Together, these two
rigidities would allow the average price to reﬂect changes in monetary policy
after 2 and a half years. This is not only in line with the aforementioned
micro evidence, but it is also close to the time at which inﬂation reaches its
peak eﬀect according to the SVAR. This is deﬁnitely an advantage compared
to standard sticky price models.
For wages, sticky information anticipates that a worker will, on the average,
adjust to changes in monetary policy two years and three quarters later.
Since the peak eﬀect on wage inﬂation occurs approximately three years after
a monetary policy shock, according to the SVAR estimations, the predictions
of this model do not appear unreasonable.
Other estimations for the U.S. Let us compare the present results with
those of some other studies concerning the rate of updating information
by ﬁrms. Dupor et al. (2008) perform estimations for the parameters of
the Phillips curve, merging sticky prices and sticky information, just as the
sticky information model presented here. Their estimations for price sticki-
ness claim that only 14 per cent (αp = 0.86) of ﬁrms change their prices every
period and 42 per cent (γp = 0.58) update information. Prices are just too
rigid in their estimations, and they are not in line with microeconomic evi-
dence. The high frequency of updating new information in their estimations
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may be due to a substitution eﬀect between price stickiness and information
stickiness, as these authors also noticed. We will be return to this issue in
the next section.
The speed of updating information has also been estimated in models where
only sticky information appears to be the source of rigidity for price setters.
Mankiw and Reis (2007) estimated a rate of updating information of 70 per
cent in its pure sticky information model. In contrast, Kahn and Zhu (2006)
estimate that only 25 per cent of ﬁrms would update information every quar-
ter. On the other hand, Andre´, Lo´pez-Salido and Nelson (2005) suggest that
between 15 and 20 per cent of ﬁrms update information every period, while
Korenok (2008) achieves a point estimate of 0.30 for the same probability.
One drawback of the models that attempt to replace sticky prices with sticky
information is that they do not take into account the fact that prices are not
fully ﬂexible, as micro data studies show. Prices are, indeed, sticky, but not
as much as most macro models suggest. Dupor et al. (2008) also reach the
same conclusions. These authors ﬁnd that aggregate data cannot ignore the
signiﬁcance of price stickiness, despite the presence of slow information spills.
Thus, sticky information cannot replace sticky prices; rather than mutually
exclusive environments, they seem to be complementary ones. Ignoring price
stickiness might bias the estimations about the degree of information stick-
iness; this could explain the large diﬀerences in magnitude reported in the
literature.
5 Sensitivity analysis
The last section highlighted the importance of selecting certain parameters
for estimation in order to improve the goodness-of-ﬁt of both models. Clearly,
the probability of changing prices and wages, along with a persistence mea-
sure of the interest rate, is crucial for the estimations of both models. In
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this section, we will try to determine whether the results of estimation set
(3) are robust to diﬀerent combinations of calibrated values. In doing so,
we will change the value of some key model parameters. Table 3 reports the
outcome of this sensitivity analysis. We will identify key parameters govern-
ing the dynamic behavior of the models related to preferences, technology,
monetary policy rule, and estimation horizon. For each alternative, the spec-
iﬁcation (3) is re-estimated for each model and the J -statistic is recomputed.
One general observation across the sensitivity analysis is that the sticky infor-
mation model always performs better in terms of inﬂation and wage inﬂation
than the backward-looking model, as can be seen when comparing the de-
composition of the J -statistic. In contrast, habit formation seems to be a
more reliable tool for explaining the dynamics of output than assuming in-
formation stickiness in households. This last result seems to be very robust
across the estimation of sets (1)-(3) in the last section and again here in the
sensitivity analysis.
The ability of both models to replicate the behavior of output, inﬂation mea-
sures, and interest rate does not appear to be heavily aﬀected by modifying
the parameters concerning preferences and technology. This is the case when
assuming that labor supply becomes highly inelastic (ωw = 10) or when con-
sumers become highly averse to risk (σ = 0.5). For technology, if we assume
constant returns to scale (φ = 1) there will be a tiny positive impact on the
predictions of inﬂation. Changing the mark-up for the goods market and the
labor market also has no signiﬁcant impact on estimations (θp = θw = 11).
Finally, reinforcing the level of raw material goods in the intermediate sector
also seems insigniﬁcant (sq = 0.7).
Changing the parameters of the interest rate reaction function has more siz-
able impacts. When assuming that monetary authorities are very averse to
inﬂation (aπ = 3), both models see their predictive power diminished to ac-
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tual inﬂation. In the same vein, if we assume a higher value for the output
gap parameter (ay = 0.125 ∗ 4) the models signiﬁcantly decrease their ability
to approximate the behavior of output. As for the sources of interest rate
inertia, if we allow ρi and ρe to be estimated simultaneously, along with the
other parameters considered in estimation set (3), we can see that nothing
changes signiﬁcantly in the J -statistic. Moreover, the estimated values for
ρi and ρe are close to what was calibrated for the former and estimated for
the latter, i.e. 0.34 and 0.92, respectively, for the sticky information model,
while we ﬁnd 0.25 and 0.92 for the backward-looking model.
When reducing the estimation horizon in terms of the impulse response func-
tions the models have to match, we see that their overall performance is re-
duced. In any case, the sticky information model is still better at anticipating
the dynamics of the inﬂation measures.
Substitution between price- and information-stickiness in the sticky
information model. The estimation sets (1)-(3), along with the sensitiv-
ity analysis, allow us to see a strong negative relation between the probability
of price changes and the rate of updating information. This same observation
was made by Dupor et al. (2008). Figure 2 shows the estimated values for
the speed in changing prices and updating information that were achieved
in the sensitivity analysis, plus the estimation sets (1)− (3). The upper-left
panel shows how price stickiness and information stickiness are substitutes in
a quite surprisingly regular manner. The same relation for wages is, however,
less consistent.
Let us now focus on prices. Among the various combinations of the esti-
mated (α, γ) pairs, the ones at the extremes are characterized by high values
of the J -statistic, as the bottom left panel of Figure 2 indicates. The pair
(α, γ) found by Dupor et al., denoted in the ﬁgure with a diamond marker,
is precisely in one of these extremes. Moreover, if we perform an estimation
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for the sticky information model calibrating αp,si as Dupor et al.’s value, the
point estimate of γp,si turns out to be 0.43, somewhat lower than the value
they found. The associated J -statistic equals 214.77, which means that Du-
por et al.’s values have a very poor ﬁt to U.S. data, according to the present
methodology. The sticky information model when using their values sim-
ply cannot simulate the dynamic behavior of actual inﬂation. This exercise
shows how the use of general equilibrium models may deliver more general
conclusions about aggregate ﬂuctuations than the use of single equations.
6 Concluding remarks
The present study considers two alternative models to replicate the behavior
of output, inﬂation, wage inﬂation, and interest rate. Sticky information is
added to households, ﬁrms, and workers in a model that assumes price stick-
iness a` la Calvo. The second speciﬁcation concerns backward-looking inﬂa-
tion indexation by ﬁrms and workers, plus habit persistence in consumption
added also to a sticky price model. Both models are then compared to the
estimated aggregate dynamics resulting from a SVAR for the U.S. for the
sample period 1960(1)-2007(2).
In general, the backward-looking model delivers robust estimations and pre-
dicts that prices will be adjusted once a year. This is, however, considerably
more price stickiness than what microeconomic observations suggest. Bils
and Klenow (2004) report that the median time for price changes is 4.3
months. The sticky information model is in line with this evidence, since
it predicts that an average ﬁrm would change its prices every 4 months,
whereas its information would be updated roughly every two years. Thus,
prices changes would react to old information, as Klenow and Willis (2007)
ﬁnd using microeconomic data. Overall, sticky information anticipates that
prices adjust to new macro innovations in 2.5 year. For wages, this mea-
sure corresponds to 3 years, on the average. Additionally, sticky informa-
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tion is better at approximating the dynamics of inﬂation measures than the
backward-looking model, as measured by the SVAR, whenever enough inter-
est rate inertia is allowed. However, when it comes to output, habit persis-
tence proves to be a more powerful tool than applying information stickiness
in households.
Adding sticky information to a standard sticky-price model may be the nat-
ural replacement for lagging inﬂation indexation. Yet, it seems that much
more work has to be done in order to deliver a sticky information model as
robust as the backward-looking model. Also, more studies about the length
of updating information using micro data, as the one by Carroll (2003) or
Klenow and Bils (2007), might prove useful for our understanding of infor-
mation diﬀusion. Finally, it is important to highlight the major limitations
of the present analysis. One concerns small sample biases, and other the dis-
advantages of limited information estimation techniques. Minimum distance
estimations, as those performed herein, can suﬀer from both problems.16 In
order to study these issues, one can use bootstrapping methods to know
the eﬀect of small sample biases on main conclusions. Also, using Bayesian
estimation or maximum likelihood could verify in which dimensions the es-
timations presented herein are robust. We leave these issues as subjects for
future research.
16See Canova and Sala (2007) for more critics of this method.
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Figure 2: Substitution between price and information stickiness
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Table 1. Calibrated Parameters
Parameters Interpretation Value
Preferences
β Subjective discount factor 0.99
σ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1.00
ωw Elasticity of marginal labor disutility 1.00
Technology
φ Inverse of the elasticity of yˆt wrt nˆt 1.33
ωp φ− 1 0.33
sx Share of material goods 0.50
θp Elasticity of demand for goods 6.00
θw Elasticity of demand for labor 21.00
Price/Wage Setting
αp Prob. of no price adj. 0.66
αw Prob. of no wage adj. 0.66
Nominal Interest Rate Target Level
aπ Monetary policy reaction to πˆt 1.500
ay Monetary policy reaction to yˆt 0.125
ρ1 Policy inertia parameter 0.20
ρ2 Correlated shocks of the monetary shock 0.90
σν Standard deviation of the monetary innovation 0.1736
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Table 2. Estimation Results
Parameter sticky information, j = si Backward-looking, j = b
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
γc,j 0.9317
(0.026)
0.9618
(0.021)
0.9689
(0.016)
0.8600
(0.003)
0.7838
(0.011)
0.8078
(0.131)
γp,j 0.7084
(0.048)
0.9594
(0.021)
0.8929
(0.158)
1.0000
(0.018)
1.0000
(0.0.077)
0.9853
(0.117)
γw,j 0.6526
(0.034)
0.9168
(0.025)
0.9067
(0.049)
1.0000
(0.013)
1.0000
(0.090)
1.0000
(0.147)
αp,j — 0.0603
(0.011)
0.2857
(0.057)
— 0.7250
(0.040)
0.7574
(0.224)
αw,j — 0.1993
(0.037)
0.3246
(0.121)
— 0.7820
(0.044)
0.8379
(0.060)
ρe — — 0.9297
(0.019)
— — 0.9184
(0.031)
J 186.41
[0.01]
87.27
[98.71]
47.13
[99.99]
85.26
[99.43]
55.66
[99.99]
45.06
[99.99]
Jy 34.14 37.77 29.70 38.59 20.29 15.60
Jπ 72.37 23.57 8.74 17.25 19.88 16.36
Jπw 60.73 13.00 2.23 4.86 5.96 4.62
Ji 19.16 12.93 6.46 24.55 9.53 8.48
Note : Standard deviations are stated in parenthesis, whereas the p-values are closed by
brackets. The latter were calculated under the null hypothesis that JT = 0, i.e., the model
is able to mimic the empirical responses of the SVAR, and under the assumption that JT ∼
χ2(dim (θ)− dim (ψ2)).
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Appendix
A The model
Hereby, the general description of the model is presented. It is worth notice
that the baseline model share the same timing restrictions than the SVAR
described in Section 3. This is achieved by assuming that output, inﬂation,
and wage inﬂation are decided prior to the observation of the monetary policy
shock, as assumed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999) and may others.
A.1 Final and Material Goods
Aggregate demand for gross output is composed of ﬁnal good demand (yt)
and material good demand (qt). The overall aggregate demand is dt ≡ yt +
qt, and Pt is the associated nominal price. Following Kimball (1995) and
Woodford (2003), the production function is of the form
∫ 1
0
G
(
dt (ς)
dt
)
dς = 1,
where dt (ς) denotes the overall demand addressed to the producer of inter-
mediate good ς ∈ [0, 1], and the function G is increasing, strictly concave,
and satisﬁes the normalization G (1) = 1. Monopolistic ﬁrms produce the
intermediate goods ς ∈ [0, 1]. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1995),
we assume that monopolist ς faces the following production possibilities
min
{
F (nt (ς))
1− sq
,
qt (ς)
sq
}
≥ dt (ς) ,
where F (·) is an increasing and concave production function, nt (ς) denotes
the input of aggregate labor (to be deﬁned later), qt (ς) denotes the input
of material goods, and sq is the share of material goods in gross output.
Let θp (z) denote the elasticity of demand for a producer of intermediate
good facing the relative demand z = dt (ς) /dt. According to our speciﬁ-
cation, θp (z) ≡ −G
′ (z) /(zG′′(z)). This illustrates that intermediate good
ﬁrms face a varying elasticity of demand for their output, implying a varying
mark-up, which is denoted by μ (z) ≡ θp(z)/(θp(z) − 1). This turns out to
be a powerful source of strategic complementarity between price setters, as
shown in Woodford (2003).
Let PT,l(ς) denote the price chosen in period T by monopolist ς, whose latest
information set corresponds to It−l for l = 1, 2, 3, ... Following Calvo (1983),
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we assume that in each period of time and prior to observing the monetary
policy shock, a monopolistic ﬁrm can re-optimize its price with probability
1 − αp, irrespective of the elapsed time since it last revised its price. If the
ﬁrm cannot re-optimize its price, the latter is rescaled according to the simple
revision rule PT,l (ς) = (1 + δ
p
t,T )Pt (ς), where
1 + δpt,T =
⎧⎨
⎩
∏T−1
j=t (1 + π)
1−γp,b(1 + Πj)
γp,b if T > t
1 otherwise
,
where Πt = Pt/Pt−1 − 1 represents the inﬂation rate and π is the steady
state inﬂation rate and γp,b ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of indexation to the
most recently available inﬂation measure. We also assume that every single
monopolist producer at period t may, with probability 1− γp,si, reset its in-
formation set to the latest available in the economy. If it is not the case, the
ﬁrm keeps its old information set.
Let P l,t(ς) denote the price chosen in period t by monopolist ς if he is drawn
to reoptimize. Denote dt,T (ς) the production of good ς in period T if ﬁrm ς
last reoptimized its price in period t. Then, P t,l(ς) can be deﬁned as
P l,t(ς) ∈ argmax
Pl,t(ς)
Et−l
∞∑
T=t
(βαp)
T−t λT
{
(1 + δpt,T )Pt,l(ς)
PT
dt,T (ς)− S(d

t,T (ς))
}
s.t.
dt,T (ς) = dT (G
′)−1
(
(1 + δpt,T )P

t,l (ς)
PT
∫ 1
0
dt (u)
dt
G′
(
dt (u)
dt
)
du
)
, and
S (dt (ς)) = WtF
−1((1− sq)dt(ς)) + sqdt(ς)
for l = 1, 2, 3... where λt is the representative household’s marginal utility of
wealth, Et−l is the expectation operator conditional on the available infor-
mation in time t − l, dt,T (ς) is the demand of good ς, and S (dt (ς)) is the
real cost of producing dt(ς) units of good ς. Standard manipulations yield
the approximate log-linearized price setting and inﬂation equations
pˆl,t = Et−l[(1− βαpi)κp(ωpYˆt + Wˆt) + βαpi(pˆl,t+1 + Πˆt+1 − γp,bΠˆt)] (A-1)
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for l = 1, 2, 3, ..., and
αp
1− αp
(
Πˆt − γp,bΠˆt−1
)
= (1− γp,si)
∞∑
l=0
γlp,sipˆl,t (A-2)
with
κ˜p ≡
1
(1− μsq)
−1 (1 + θpμ) + θpωp
.
The above equations are expressed in terms of the log-deviations from the
steady state levels. θp ≡ θp (1) is the steady state elasticity of demand for
a producer of intermediate good, and ωp is the real marginal cost elasticity
with respect to the level of production, equal to
ωp ≡ −
F ′′ (n)n
F ′ (n)
F (n)
F ′ (n)n
.
F (n), F ′ (n), and F ′′ (n) denote the value of F and its ﬁrst and second
derivatives, evaluated at the steady state value of n. Following Woodford
(2003), we let μ denote the elasticity of μ (ξ) in the neighborhood of ξ = 1,
i.e. μ = μ
′ (1) /μ (1). Equation (2) comes from the assumption that γp,b = 0
while γp,si > 0. For equation (13), it is assumed that γp,b > 0 while γp,si = 0.
A.2 Aggregate labor index and Households
Following Erceg et al. (2000), we assume for convenience that a set of dif-
ferentiated labor inputs, indexed by υ ∈ [0, 1], are aggregated into a single
labor index ht by competitive ﬁrms, which will be referred hereafter as labor
intermediaries. The latter produce the aggregate labor input according to
the following Constant Elasticity of Substitution technology
ht =
(∫ 1
0
ht (υ)
(θw−1)/θw dυ
)θw/(θw−1)
,
where θw > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two labor types.
The associated aggregate nominal wage obeys
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt (υ)
1−θw dυ
)1/(1−θw)
,
where Wt (υ) denotes the nominal wage rate associated to type-υ labor.
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The economy is inhabited by a continuum of diﬀerentiated households, in-
dexed by υ ∈ [0, 1]. A typical household selects a sequence of consumptions
and nominal money and bond holdings, as well as a nominal wage. House-
holds diﬀer in two dimensions: ﬁrst, by the information they have available
at the time they take their decisions; and second, by the speciﬁc labor type
they are endowed with. Household υ’s objective is to maximize
EΦt
∞∑
T=t
βT−t [U(cT − γc,bcT−1, mT )− V (hT (υ))] ,
subject to the sequence of constraints
Ptct + Mt +
Bt
1 + it
≤ Wt (υ)ht (υ) + Bt−1 + Mt−1 + Υt + Ptdivt,
where EΦt is a conditional expectation operator reﬂecting the particular infor-
mation set at the household’s disposal when taking their decisions. Namely,
it is assumed that consumption and wages are decided prior the realization of
shocks, while bonds and money holdings are decided afterwards. β ∈ (0, 1)
is the subjective discount factor, γc,b ∈ [0, 1) is the habit parameter, ct is
consumption, mt = Mt/Pt denotes real cash balances at the end of the pe-
riod, where Mt denotes nominal cash balances; ht (υ) denotes household υ’s
labor supply at period t; divt denotes real proﬁts redistributed by monopo-
listic ﬁrms; Bt denotes the nominal bonds acquired in period t and maturing
in period t + 1; it denotes the gross nominal interest rate; Υt is a nominal
transfer from the government. As in Woodford (2003), we assume that there
is a satiation level m∗ for real balances such that Um = 0 for m ≥ m
∗. Thus,
when mt reaches m
∗ from below, the transaction services of real cash bal-
ances yield lower and lower marginal utility. We also consider, for the sake
of simplicity, a separable utility function between money and consumption.
Households are composed of two entities: a consumer and a worker. The
former chooses consumption, money, and bond holdings, while the latter sets
his wage by using his monopolistic power, since every household is diﬀer-
ent, depending on its labor type. As Mankiw and Reis (2007), we allow
consumers to have a diﬀerent frequency of processing new information than
workers, as this will give a diﬀerent dimensions to consumption and wage
inﬂation inertia. The latter implies that the probabilities of updating (and
processing) new information is diﬀerent: let 1− γc,b denote this probability
for the consumer and 1− γw,b for the worker.
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A.2.1 The consumer decision
Let λt denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household’s budget
constraint. The loglinearization of the ﬁrst order conditions associated with
ct, Bt, and Mt for a consumer with information set It−l yields
Et−l−k
[
βγc,b(cˆl,t+1 − γc,bcˆl,t)
]
= Et−l−k
[
cˆl,t − γc,bcˆl,t−1 + ϕ
−1λˆl,t
]
, (A-3)
λˆl,t = Et−l
[
ıˆt + λˆl,t+1 − Πˆt+1
]
. (A-4)
mˆl,t = Et−l−k
[
ηyλl,t − ηiıˆt
]
. (A-5)
for l = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., with
k =
{
0, if l > 0;
1, if l = 0
Aggregate consumption and money demand are given by:
Cˆt = (1− γc,si)
∞∑
l=0
γlc,sicˆl,t (A-6)
mˆt = (1− γc,si)
∞∑
l=0
γlc,simˆl,t (A-7)
where cˆl,t, mˆl,t, ıˆt, and λˆl,t are the log-deviations of cl,t, ml,t, 1 + it, and λl,t,
respectively, and the auxiliary parameters σ, ϕ, ηy, and ηi are deﬁned as
σ−1 = −
Uccc
Uc
, ϕ−1 = (1− βγc,b)σ,
ηy = ηi
ı¯
1 + ı¯
, ηi = −
(1− βγc,b)Uc
Ummm
.
ı¯ is the steady state value of the nominal interest rate. Equation (A-3)
illustrates the role played by habits in consumption, which reinforces the
backward dimension of the IS curve. Equation (A-4) is the standard Euler
equation on bond holdings. Finally, equation (A-5) is a standard money de-
mand function. Equation (1) comes from the assumption that γc,b = 0 while
γc,si > 0. For equation (11), it is assumed that γc,b > 0 while γc,si = 0.
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A.2.2 The worker decision
A typical household υ acts as a monopoly supplier of type-υ labor. It is
assumed that at each point in time only a fraction 1− αw of the households
can set a new wage, which will remain ﬁxed until the next time period the
household is drawn to reset its wage. The remaining households simply revise
their wages according to the backward-looking rule WT (υ) = (1+δ
w
t,T )Wt (υ),
where
1 + δwt,T =
⎧⎨
⎩
∏T−1
j=t (1 + π)
1−γw,b(1 + Πj)
γw,b if T > t
1 otherwise
,
where γw,b ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of indexation to the most recently
available inﬂation measure.
The implied labor-type υ demand by the labor intermediaries is
hT (υ) =
(
(1 + δwt,T )Wt (υ)
WT
)−θw
hT .
Wt (υ) is then selected so as to maximize
Et−l
∞∑
T=t
(βαw)
T−t
{
λT
(1 + δwt,T )Wt (υ)
PT
ht (υ)− V (ht (υ))
}
.
for l = 1, 2, 3, ..., subject to the speciﬁc labor demand just described above.
Log-linearizing the associated ﬁrst order condition yields
wˆl,t = Et−l
[
(1−βαw)κ˜w
(
ωwφcˆt−λˆt−Wˆt
)
+βαw(wˆl,t+1+Πˆ
w
t+1−γw,bΠˆt)
]
(A-8)
and
αw
1− αw
(
Πˆwt − γw,bΠˆt−1
)
= (1− γw,si)
∞∑
l=0
γlw,siwˆl,t (A-9)
where Πˆwt is wage inﬂation, and the auxiliary parameters φ, κ˜ω, and ωω are
deﬁned as
φ =
F (n)
F ′ (n)n
, κ˜w =
1
1 + ωwθw
, ωw =
Vhhh
Vh
.
Here, γw,b governs the sensitivity of nominal wages to lagged inﬂation, and
thus reinforces the persistence of wage inﬂation. In contrast, γw,si is equiv-
alent to the proportion of workers that are unaware about the shocks in
monetary policy in period t. Equation (3) comes from the assumption that
γw,b = 0 while γw,si > 0. For equation (14), it is assumed that γw,b > 0 while
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γw,si = 0. Finally, notice that Πˆt and Πˆ
w
t are linked together through the
relation
Πˆwt = Wˆt − Wˆt−1 + Πˆt, (A-10)
which is a simple “accounting” identity.
A.3 Monetary Policy
The model is closed by postulating a monetary policy rule of the form
ıˆ∗t = aππˆt + ayyˆt, (A-11)
ıˆt = ρ1 ıˆt−1 + (1− ρ1) ıˆ
∗
t + et, (A-12)
et = ρ2et−1 + νt, νt ∼ iid(0, σ
2
ν). (A-13)
Equation (A-11) is similar to that proposed by Taylor (1993). Here ıˆ∗t is
the target interest rate that depends on current inﬂation and (model–based)
output gaps. More precisely, aπ and ay govern the sensitivity of the desired
level of the nominal interest rate to the log deviations of inﬂation and output
gaps. The monetary policy rule delivers interest rate persistence from two
sources. First, the central bank’s aim in smoothing the interest rate is de-
noted by ρi; and second, persistent deviations from the baseline rule, which
consists of the discretionary part of monetary policy, are denoted by ρe.
A.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, it must be the case that Yt = Ct and ht = nt. Further-
more, from the aggregate production function, it must also be the case that
nˆt = φYˆt, where φ
−1 = F ′ (n)n/F (n). Substituting these relations in the
system composed of (A-1)-(A-13), we obtain a rational expectations system
of linear equations.
In the case of the backward-looking model, i.e. when γx,b > 0 and γx,si = 0
for x ∈ {p, c, w}, the rational expectations system (11)-(15) is solved using
standard methods. For the case of the extended sticky information model,
i.e. when γx,si > 0 and γx,b = 0, the method of resolution is a bit more
complex, and is presented next.
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B Resolution by undetermined coeﬃcients
B.1 Solving a simple sticky-information model
In order to introduce the main idea behind the resolution of a rational ex-
pectation models with information lags, please consider the following very
simple and stylized model. There are only two variables in the economy:
one endogenous, ct, that is determined according to a decision rule; and one
exogenous, xt, which we consider to follow an AR(1) process. Also, assume
there is a continuum of agents distributed into two types: the fully informed
agent and the less aware agent. The information set of the fully aware agent
correspond to the most available in the economy, where the description of
shocks and the evolution of xt in the present period are given; this set of
news is denoted by It. The less inform agent becomes aware of the evolution
of shocks only l′ > 0 periods after they are realized, so his information set
is given by It−l′ . In all other respects, including preferences, both agents are
just the same. This implies that both agents will act similarly whenever they
share the same information.
Deﬁne cl,t as the decision made in period t by agent with information set
It−l, for l ∈ {0, l
′}. Also, deﬁne 1−μ as the proportion of fully aware agents
in the economy. Therefore, Ct = (1−μ)c0,t + μcl′,t at each and every period.
For the sake of simplicity, let the decision rule for which agent l determines
cl,t be the following (e.g., think in the euler equation of consumption, for
instance, in a simple DSGE model):
cl,t = Et−l (cl,t+1 + bxt)
where Et−l denotes the expectation operator conditional to the information
set It−l and b is a constant. If xt follows a process like
xt = ρxt−1 + σεt with εt ∼ idd(0, 1),
where σ > 0 is a constant and ρ ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of persistence
of xt, then, the equilibrium dynamics of variable cl,t are given by:
cl,t = Et−l
(
b
1− ρ
xt
)
(A-14)
for l ∈ {0, l′}. The direct implication is that cl′,t = Et−l′c0,t. Therefore,
cl′,t = c0,t whenever It = It−l′ . This implies that we can focus on the re-
sponses of the fully aware agent, in order to disentangle the dynamics of Ct,
41
the aggregate endogenous variable.
Assume we depart from the steady state equilibrium at period -1, and a shock
hits the economy in period 0 (i.e., ε−1 = 0 and ε0 = 0). Assume also that
l′ = 1. If no further perturbations hit the economy afterwards, the above
example implies that the evolution of Ct is given by:
C−1 = 0
C0 = (1− μ)c0,0
C1 = (1− μ)c0,1 + μc1,1 = c0,1, since c1,1 = c0,1
C2 = c0,2 and so on
In the case where 1−μ represents the probability of updating and processing
new information by any agent in each and every period, independently of
the elapsed period he last updated, we will end up in an economy with an
inﬁnite type of agents. In the latter case, a proportion 1−μ of agents would
have the latest information available, (1− μ)μ would posses It−1, (1− μ)μ
2
would have It−2, and so on. In the example just given above, i.e., when the
economy is hit by a shock only in period 0, the dynamics of the aggregate
variable at period T > 0 will be given by:
CT ≡ (1− μ)
∞∑
l=0
μlcl,T = (1− μ)
T∑
k=0
μkc0,T = (1− μ
T+1)c0,T . (A-15)
In this special case, there is no interaction between agents, and therefore we
can ﬁnd a closed-form solution for the variable c0,t. But when interactions
do exist among agents, then a closed-form solution for c0,t is rather the ex-
ception than the rule. Consider, for example, that the exogenous variable
follows the rule xt = ηCt + εt. In this case, the decision of the agent with full
information is directly inﬂuenced by the agents with lagged information. The
dimension of the rational expectations model directly expands to account for
all type of agents. To avoid this problem, one can use an approach based on
undetermined coeﬃcients.
B.2 Undetermined coeﬃcients
We make now explicit reference to the system of equations (1)-(9). The ag-
gregate dynamics at equilibrium of the model economy imply that the devi-
ations from the steady state are history dependent on the sequence of shocks
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in monetary policy νt. Thus, the price level that fully aware ﬁrms charge at
time t (if drawn to re-optimize) can be represented as: pˆ0,t =
∑∞
k=0 p0kνt−k,
where p0k is function of the deep parameters of the economy. In the same
vein, ﬁrms with one information lag set pˆ1,t =
∑
∞
k=0 p1kνt−k. In this latter
case, by deﬁnition, the coeﬃcient p10 equals zero, since the ﬁrm is not aware
about the current shock νt.
Agents with the same technology or preferences will choose the same deci-
sions when facing similar environments. In this case, agents of equal kind,
sharing the same information, will choose the same things. The direct im-
plication if this statement is that lagged information agents will mimic the
fully aware agent. Thus, pjk = p0k whenever j ≥ k, and 0 otherwise. Thus,
we can simply focus on the fully aware agents to determine the equilibrium
dynamics of the whole economy.17
Inﬂation would thus be determined by:
Πˆt =
∞∑
k=0
Πkνt−k
where
Πk =
1− αp
αp
(1− γp,si)p0k
k∑
j=0
γjp,si
=
1− αp
αp
(1− γk+1p,si )p0k
The same reasoning applies for output and wage inﬂation, whose behavior
can be totally expressed in terms of the fully aware agents:
Yˆt =
∞∑
k=0
Ykνt−k
Πˆwt =
∞∑
k=0
Πwk νt−k
17It is possible to show that lagged information agents, in this model, have no incentives
to overreact or to compensate their lack of awareness. They just adjust as soon as they
learn new information; this translates, by their optimality welfare-maximizing conditions,
into “bygones are bygones”.
43
with
Yk = (1− γ
k+1
c,si )y0k
Πwk =
1− αw
αw
(1− γk+1w,si)w0k
where y0k and w0k are the k coeﬃcients from the consumption and real wages
sequence of the full informed agents.
Let vector xk = [y0k, p0k, w0k,Wk, ik, ek]
′ contain the k coeﬃcients for con-
sumption, prices, and real wages for the fully aware agents, plus aggregate
real wages, nominal interest rates, and the persistent monetary shock, re-
spectively. Equations (1)-(9) implies that we can express the undetermined
coeﬃcients k as the solution of the system:
Akxk = Bkxk+1
where Ak and Bk are 6× 6 matrices that stands for:
Ak =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 σ 1−αp
αp
(1− γk+2p,si ) 0 0 0 0
0 βp 0 0 0 0
0 0 βw 0 0 0
0 −1−αp
αp
(1− γk+1p,si )
1−αw
αw
(1− γk+1w,si) 1 0 0
−a˜y −a˜p 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Bk =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0 0 0
−(1− αpβ)κ˜pωp(1− γ
k+1
c,si ) 1 0 −(1− αpβ)κp 0 0
−(1− αwβ)κ˜ωω˜ω(1− γ
k+1
c,si ) 0 1 (1− αwβ)κω 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 ρe
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
with βj = β
(
αj + (1− αj)(1− γ
k+2
j,h )
)
for j ∈ {p, w}, a˜y = (1 − ρi)ay(1 −
γk+1c,si ), a˜p = (1 − ρi)ap
1−αp
αp
(1 − γk+1p,si ), and ω˜ω = ωωφ + σ
−1. The essential
characteristic of this system is that matrices Ak and Bk depend upon the
ordering of the undetermined coeﬃcients. If there were no informational lags
(all γ’s equal zero), A and B will be constant, and thus by knowing the
ﬁrst series of coeﬃcients (k=0) we would know the rest of them trough a
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geometrical decreasing sequence. The fact that more and more agents are
adjusting every period, makes the algorithm non-linear, yielding a persistent
path for xk. In such a case, we have to solve for xk, xk+1, xk+2, and so on,
since aggregate variables are changing all the time, adding the reactions of
the agents who become aware.
Deﬁne zk = Q
−1
k xk, where Q
−1
k is the inverse of the matrix formed with the
eigenvectors of B−1k Ak. Therefore, we can express
zk = Λkzk+1
where Λk is a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues of matrix B
−1
k Ak. Also, we
need additional information concerning the initial conditions of the economy
and the distribution of shocks. For the former, we assume all predetermined
variables equal to zero, that is: W−1 = i−1 = e−1 = 0. For the latter, the
AR(1) process of the monetary shocks implies: ek = ρ
k
eσν ∀j ≥ 0. The
above system is then solved by standard methods. Notice that if we want
to analyze an horizon of T periods after the incidence of a monetary policy
shock, we have to solve the system for k = 0, 1, 2, ..., T , that is, T + 1 times.
This concludes the description of the resolution algorithm.
Determinacy. The determinacy of the model do not depend on the in-
formational structure of the economy. If we want to determine whether the
model presents a determinate equilibrium, we only have to check the case of
full information, that is when all γj,h are equal to zero. Thus, if the number
of eigenvalues that are inside the unit circle corresponds to the number of
free variables (in this case yk, pk, and wk), then the system has a regular
equilibrium and is not driven by sunspot shocks.
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